• An image of this railroad carriage, which is exhibited in one of Kyiv’s central squares, has gone viral in Ukraine. It was part of a special train that regularly evacuated Ukrainians from the almost-encircled city of Irpin in the first days of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. 



    On 3 March, the carriage was hit by shelling and badly damaged by shrapnel. Fortunately, there were no casualties and the train continued its journey.

    Before the war, the state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia was seen as a problem: inefficient, corrupt, opaque, and too big to be closed down due to its up to 400,000 employees. Several attempts to reform the company had failed. 


    In the crisis of the last two years, however, its shortcomings proved to be a lifesaver. As a centralised state structure, it is reliable and fast in evacuations. Its unprofitable and widespread network, with many branch lines, meant that for many communities in at-risk areas, the railways were sometimes the only way out of danger.

    And, despite the everyday challenges of life in Ukraine, there are no delays.

    Jon Worth has probably travelled every train route in Europe. Founder of the ‘Trains for Europe’ platform and a regular commentator on the subject, he has a broad perspective on the opportunities and problems of European rail connectivity.

    Europe has, in general, fairly well-developed rail networks. Is this a good starting point for a truly connected continent?

    We don’t really have a European rail network. We have 27 national railway networks with some international connections between them. There are lines that cross borders, all of them of lesser quality, and less used. And this happens more or less at every single border crossing between European countries. There are even cases where one train stops before the border, and the other train starts after the border, but a few kilometres away, with nothing in between. That’s the key problem: to have a European mindset to think about trains.

    But there are technical problems: track gauges are not always the same in bordering countries, there are different electrical systems, and national railways are centred on capital cities.

    Partly. But the technical problems are less important than the mentality and coordination problems. For example, in Spain, which has a different gauge from France, you have to make sure that the timetables are coordinated so that passengers can get to the station and take the next French train. There are simple solutions for these technical problems if the companies are willing.

    With all the talk of going green, and the backlash against short-haul flights, is there a window of opportunity to revitalise rail transport?

    There is a great opportunity. Especially for leisure travel or weekend excursions. Hungary is a very good example, there has been a massive increase in trains going from Budapest to the countryside, instead of people taking cars. 2020 was a record year for rail ticket sales, I think 2023 will be an even bigger record year.

    The problem is that the demand is there, but the question is whether the railway companies will be able to meet this demand. I am not entirely sure. In France, for example, their high-speed trains have fewer seats than a decade ago.

    If there was a book of negative world records, the Romanian State Railway Company (CFR) would certainly be breaking some of them. In a country cut in two by the Carpathian mountains, travel is difficult between the main regions, therefore rail transport is of strategic importance. However, the state-owned passenger transport system is falling apart.

    70 percent of the railway lines are in need of rehabilitation. The average speed of trains is less than 70 km/h – the same as 150 years ago. Three out of four trains are delayed. In 2022 alone, the total amount of delays accumulated was equivalent to eight years.

    Europe’s most touristic destination has for years been unreachable by international train. Meanwhile, Greece’s domestic lines paint a similarly grim picture. Chronic financial and staff shortages, corruption and disregard for EU rules are the main causes for the current decline.

    In 2011, trains linking Thessaloniki with the Balkans and then to the rest of Europe were suspended by the Greek government. They relaunched briefly in 2014, before being cancelled again for good.

    Jointly operated by Turkey and Greece, the train connecting Thessaloniki to Istanbul launched in 2005, but was slashed in 2011 due to cost-cutting by the then Greek state-owned company TrainOSE.

    Turns out, these lines simply could not keep pace with cars, buses, and planes.

    The Thessaloniki-Alexandroupolis route, the most important domestic railway line since 2010, has suffered from a lack of staff and maintenance, placing the infrastructure in an atrocious state. The 440 km route now takes 8.5 to nine hours. George Nathenas, a traffic expert, says that was also causing problems for the cancelled Thessaloniki-Istanbul route.

    Over the last 30 years, despite available funding, the modernisation of the network has been one big failure.

    “The memorandums imposed [by the IMF, EU and Greek Government] due to the Greek financial crisis caused the laying off of experienced personnel and the separation of the national railway company into independent legal entities that dispute among themselves, and this also had implications,” explains Nathenas.

    This degenerated from bad to worse. Last February, 57 people lost their lives in a head-on collision between two trains near Tempi Valley, provoking a national outcry. A prosecutor’s investigation discovered the automated system for re-routing trains, which would have prevented the human error, did not work.

    In September, severe damage on the railway network was caused by the storm Daniel. The government promised a full recovery of the damaged railway – but only in the next 1.5 years. Even if this is achieved, this would still be a drop in the ocean of problems that need to be solved.

    France’s ageing nuclear plants shut down many reactors for maintenance last winter, forcing the country to import electricity for the first time since 1980. This year less turbulence is expected for the country’s power sector and France is again becoming a key electricity exporter, according to energy expert Nicolas Goldberg, energy expert at Colombus consulting and for the Terra Nova think tank.

    Are France’s nuclear power stations better prepared for winter than last year?

    The situation is undeniably much better than last year. The availability of nuclear power supply in October was comparable to that of 2019 [i.e. at its highest level for four years]. Not all the reactor maintenance problems have been resolved, but progress has been made. Concerns for this winter are very moderate, especially as there are still traces of last year’s energy savings plan.

    Will this mean lower prices for customers?

    Market prices are set by anticipating the next day’s price and by confidence in production. In September, French market prices were below German prices, which is almost unheard of. This shows that confidence has returned. It’s also good news for Europe. France is once again exporting electricity, and we’re even close to maximum export capacity. The French nuclear system has once again become an asset for the European market.

    Could the situation in the Middle East, on the other hand, push up European energy prices?

    Gas markets are very nervous, and following the Hamas attacks, gas prices jumped slightly. But in the medium term, there shouldn’t be any major consequences. Israeli gas is hardly ever exported to Europe.

    In the early hours of Sunday 8 October, pressure at the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland suddenly started to drop.

    There was a heavy storm that weekend, but when the authorities were finally able to investigate the seabed, they discovered traces of something being dragged along the bottom, a torn pipeline and a broken anchor.

    A data cable dozens of miles to the east was torn in half. Another cable that connects Estonia and Sweden was also malfunctioning. Similar traces to the pipeline site were found in both these locations.

    The prime suspect of these incidents is the Chinese cargo vessel Newnew Polar Bear, which passed each location around the time the damage took place. A photo taken a few days later shows Newnew Polar Bear missing an anchor and its containers tilting heavily to one side.

    The ship’s crew has refused to respond to investigators’ inquiries. It is not clear if an actor caused the damages knowingly or accidentally, but the incident indicates how easy it is to sabotage critical undersea infrastructure.

    Although the Balticconnector will be out of service until at least April next year, the two countries’ energy supplies are safe. But NATO has stepped up surveillance of the Baltic Sea area to prevent further incidents.

    If I were to describe the mood in Ukraine this October in one word, it would be “anticipation”. We know the Russian missiles will come. We are waiting for the enemy to try and deprive us of electricity, and, if it’s lucky, heat. We are aware our energy infrastructure is more fragile than last year and Russia is probably so short of missiles that it cannot afford to make mistakes.

    Last year, the first massive missile attack that targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure happened on 10 October. That evening, authorities in Ukraine asked the population to minimise their electricity consumption. A week later, after another attack, blackouts started, streets went dark, and one could find cafés and shops by the sound of the rumbling diesel generators powering them.

    Now, we are trying to be better prepared. Several of my friends tweaked their internet access to ensure the connection could last longer during outages. NGOs are supplying different communities and companies with charging stations which can power several devices for a day. I have also received one. Some people are insulating their houses and flats, so less heat can escape.

    But for power generation and transmission systems, it is hard to prepare. Power lines were restored after suffering damage, but repairing large generating or distributing facilities which were badly affected is costly and complicated. Sometimes it’s even better to build a new substation or thermal power plant, instead of repairing the old one. But this takes years ― which we obviously haven’t had since last winter.

    When I go to bed, I often think: maybe, this will be the night of the Russian attack? It will probably be massive, in order to overwhelm our anti-air system. Maybe, it will involve swarms of drones too. So far, the invader isn’t ready yet.

    When it will come, it won’t feel catastrophic. Our backyards are still dotted with generators, big and small. If we are unlucky this winter, the streets will just fill again with their humming.

    When Bulgaria introduced a 10 euros per MW/hour “punitive” tax on Russian natural gas transit in October, neighbouring Serbia and fellow EU member Hungary cried foul.

    The two Moscow-friendly governments called this a “hostile” move which jeopardises their energy security ahead of the winter heating season.

    The tax is equal to roughly 20 percent of Europe’s benchmark gas prices, and is expected to bring some 1.1 billion euros to Bulgaria this season. The move could also reduce profits on Russian-based companies, whose tax revenues fuel Moscow’s war machine in Ukraine.

    While EU countries are publishing victory reports on their divorce from dependence on Russian energy, Hungary is using words that are pleasing to Vladimir Putin’s ears. Most recently, these came from the country’s chief diplomat, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, who is best known for his friendly visits to Asian dictatorships.

    Speaking at the opening of the Eurasian Security Conference in Minsk, Szijjártó said: “We see energy security as a matter of physical reality, not a political issue,” and added that Hungary would maintain pragmatic cooperation with Russia.

    His words are easy to translate: independence from Russian energy is still out of the question. But The European Commission’s State of the Energy Union Report underlines that such a high level of dependence poses a threat to the security of supply to Hungary.

    Whether Russian gas is really the only solution, as the government regularly claims, is questionable, given that Hungary has several alternatives, thanks to pipeline connections to neighbouring countries.

    Indeed, there are already plans to further diversify Hungary’s gas sources. Connecting to the Baltic Pipeline would open up the North Sea gas fields directly to Budapest. Last year, Romania also relaunched the development of the Neptun gas field in the Black Sea, of which Hungary would be a major customer. Hungary has also started buying gas from Azerbaijan, in line with the European Union’s programme.

    However, the Hungarian government has no intention of quitting a 15-year gas supply contract Orbán signed with Gazprom in 2021.

    The government explained the need for the contract as this ensured predictable, long-term supply and a discounted price. A few weeks before the invasion of Ukraine, Putin also claimed that the contract would allow Hungary to receive gas at a fifth of the market price. But that proved to be a lie, as energy prices remained volatile.

    The population – on the other hand – is not directly aware of this scam.

    European voters have just taught us that the rise of the far right is not an incontrovertible fate.

    I had no optimistic scenario in my mind, while waiting for the results at Civic Coalition leader Donald Tusk’s headquarters during the election night. Having seen the re-election of Viktor Orbán in April 2022, I knew how hard it was to change the rulers, when they have imposed their own rules. If a party controls the media, and influences the judges, their grip on power becomes stronger, and the more difficult it is to subvert the regime.

    But then voters came with their push for a change. Although both the Spanish Popular Party and the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party were ready to break the cordon sanitaire and use far-right seats as a crutch to bring them into government, the people in both countries said no to this plan: neither Spain’s Vox nor Poland’s Konfederacja performed well at the elections. This showed us how vibrant European democracies still are.

    Before Poland’s elections, I visited the headquarters of the feminist movement “Strajk Kobiet” in Warsaw. I asked Marta Lempart, the leader of Polish pro-abortion protests, what had become of that unprecedented wave of dissent. She told me: “We changed our society; now we have to change politics.” The huge amount of young people, and women, that queued up to vote on 15 October, proved her right.

    Law and Justice is still the party with most votes, and it still holds the levers of power: as Konfederacja’s leader Sławomir Mentzen said, “if Tusk wants to govern Poland, he will have the President of the Republic, the public TV and the Constitutional Court against him.”

    Nevertheless, a majority of Polish voters asked for change. The high level of participation in the polls, the pro-European and pro-rule of law stances that the winning opposition embodies, provoked “a sigh of relief in Brussels and many capitals”, as Dutch MEP Sophie in’t Veld told me: “Europe was pulled back from the brink”.