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― Yevhen Hlibovytsky, Ukrainian public intellectual and Ukrainian Public Broadcaster board member.

All major political parties in Poland support Ukraine’s fight against the Russian invasion, so a victory for either the Law and Justice (PiS) party or the Civic Coalition-led opposition would have helped Kyiv.

But in the weeks leading up to the elections, Ukraine-related issues became highly politicised in Poland, including the revival of past conflicts to questions about Ukrainian grain prices and refugees. By criticising Kyiv, PiS tried to attract more voters from poorer regions.

A Ukraine-sceptic agenda was also adopted by the Polish public broadcaster TVP.

There are hopes that German-Polish relations can become less tense, says Rolf Nikel, vice-president of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and a former German ambassador to Poland. He has recently published a book on Polish-German relations.

As Poland’s government is about to change, many people are hoping for a better and more constructive relationship with Germany. Is that hope justified?

With the opposition’s unexpectedly clear victory in the Polish parliamentary elections, Poland has made a powerful return to the European stage. This victory must now be translated into the formation of a stable government.

There are justified hopes that Polish foreign policy as a whole will become more predictable again and that relations with Germany will become significantly less tense. However, a simple return to the pre-2015 era will hardly be possible; but, a different rhetoric and a positive climate for talks would create good conditions for a new start of the relations.

In which areas do you see the greatest challenges in German-Polish relations?

The biggest challenge at the moment is the joint shaping of Europe’s eastern policy. By insisting on integrating Russia into the security architecture in Europe, Germany has been losing a lot of credibility in the past, which now needs to be regained.

Poland must also rebuild trust by arranging judicial reform in line with basic European norms. Also, differences of opinion on migration policy will not disappear anytime soon.

Where do you see the largest potential for joint German-Polish initiatives?

The chances for a fresh start are good. The common shaping of the future European Eastern policy on an equal footing is currently the priority. In this context, intensifying cooperation in the Weimar Triangle with France and Poland, including Kyiv on all issues concerning Ukraine, would be highly desirable.

While compensation for German crimes in World War II is legally settled, voluntary payments within a limited financial scope based on a moral responsibility of Germany make sense. The planned German-Polish House of Remembrance and Encounter in Berlin, mandated by the German Bundestag, should be moved forward quickly.

On the first day following his election victory in 2010, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán travelled to Warsaw, where he was welcomed by his Polish counterpart Donald Tusk. Thirteen years later, Tusk is about to return to power, while Orbán seems to have chosen a different partner.

When Orbán met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing last week, much of the Western world was aghast. Some called it “shame”, others a “security concern”, or even an embarrassment. It did not go down well with the Poles who – up until now – were staunch allies of the Hungarian government in the European Council.

A change of government in Poland could increase Orbán’s isolation within the EU. The PM may be comforted by the support of Slovakia’s returning populist Prime Minister Robert Fico, but the loss of the famous Polish-Hungarian friendship would be a serious blow.

And cosying up to war criminals does not seem to help his case.

I was eight years old when communism collapsed in Poland, but I remember well the atmosphere of that time: Solidarity posters, family discussions about whether the ‘commies’ could be defeated, and great hopes for better times ahead. Hardly anyone expected it to succeed: the communists had the whole state apparatus, the media and the militia on their side.

Yet we prevailed. On 4 June 1989, communism came to an end in Poland.

Thirty-four years later, on 15 October 2023, the atmosphere surrounding the Polish elections was similar. Although we are now living in a free Poland, the reality was just as grey, harsh and devoid of hope for change. For the past eight years, we have watched the country slide into the depths of authoritarianism.

Instead of engaging in a lively discussion, we were condemned to listen to a monologue conducted by those in power. Anyone who thought differently was an enemy of the nation (or rather of the authorities). The nationalism that emanated daily from the mouths of the politicians in power left no room for us to breathe.

As in 1989, many believed that these elections would not change anything. But, just like at that historic juncture, the people of Poland proved to be unpredictable. The opposition — pro-European, democratic, with smiles on their faces — won unequivocally.

This happened because Poles mobilised on an unprecedented scale. Turnout exceeded a record 74 per cent, with some voters queuing for up to six hours to cast their ballots.

Once again, it proved that when Poles mobilise, they can rise to beautiful things. These elections restored my faith in democracy, people and Poland.

It is also a sign for the whole of Europe: authoritarian politicians do not know the day or the hour when the nation will shake them off.

This photo of graffiti with the word “Together” in Hebrew and Ukrainian, and the coats of arms of both nations recently went viral in Ukraine. 

It was posted by Yigal Levin, former Israeli soldier and Ukrainian journalist, and gathered thousands of positive reactions. Ukrainians can relate to Israelis: the Hamas attack was as reckless and violent to civilians, as Russia’s full-scale invasion. Both Hamas and Russia want to annihilate the state they’ve invaded.

Last year, Ukrainian officials and citizens voiced their disappointment with Israel‘s reaction to what Ukrainians see as a genocidal war. There were expectations that Israelis, who also faced existential threats, would generously support Kyiv with weapons, such as the “Iron Dome” air defense system.

But Tel Aviv’s reaction was lukewarm, as Israel argued that it didn’t want to challenge a shaky balance in the Middle East region. Now, as war has returned to both the Middle East and Ukraine, both nations have got closer. In Israeli social media, there are now many signs of support for Ukraine.

Marko Mihkelson is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Estonian parliament Riigikogu. He says the expected attack by Israeli ground forces against Hamas in Gaza will deepen divisions in Europe.

There is a lot of speculation that the Israel-Hamas war will take the West’s attention away from helping Ukraine to fight against Russia. How concerned are you about it?
 
Everything depends on the further course of the Israel-Hamas war and its possible escalation. If the war were to expand and involve Hezbollah and Iran behind it, this has the potential to develop into a conflict affecting global relations. It is in Russia’s interest to tie the US public to Israel for as long as possible in order to distract from Ukraine’s central role.

How can it affect the security of Estonia and the other Baltic states?

The war in Israel is undeniably linked to the war in Ukraine. Firstly, it is in Russia’s interest to light new fires in various hotspots of the world right now in order to distract the attention of the US and Western countries. Secondly, the expected attack by Israeli ground forces against Hamas in Gaza will deepen divisions in Europe.

Thirdly, potential new migration pressures on Europe may and will only exacerbate political polarisation. All of this together weakens the ability of the Western Allies to take a strong and unified strategic stance, the main goal of which should be the defeat of Russia. If Russia cannot be pushed back strategically, then the security of the Baltic states and thus the whole of NATO is also at risk.

Last Friday, when Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán received news of a planned demonstration in support of Gaza in Budapest, he banned it instantly. “No one is allowed to hold demonstrations promoting the cause of terrorist organisations because that, in itself, would pose a threat of terror,” he said.

For once, Orban’s actions were not isolated. Pro-Palestinian and pro-Hamas demonstrations were banned or broken up by police in other European cities.

But the European Union as an institution still faces a dilemma. Though mostly united and effective in its support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, its statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seem to be more complicated. While EU leaders are showing full solidarity with Israel and the country’s right to defend itself, some are expressing the importance of providing urgent humanitarian aid to Gaza and the need to comply with international law.

Disagreements started to show days after Hamas terrorists broke into Israel and murdered 1,300 people. On Monday, Hungarian enlargement commissioner Oliver Várhelyi announced an immediate suspension of EU aid to Gaza, apparently without consulting his colleagues. The Commission replied with not only a denial, but the tripling of humanitarian assistance to 75 million euros.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also faced criticism after not speaking up about the humanitarian consequences of Israel’s retaliatory attacks during her visit to the country. “She simply said Israel has the right to defend itself, full stop. That is not the line member states agreed,” a diplomat told Politico. Individual member states are also divided on the issue, with only Austria and Germany cutting aid to Palestinians.

This is not the first time that divisions within the 27 member states mirror the feelings within different European societies. In fact, the 2003 U.S.led invasion of Iraq caused a far greater rupture in the EU. But if the European Union wants to live up to the idea of “unity is strength”, there is still some way to go.

“The sense of security of Jewish people in Germany will be gone for a long time”.

Marina Chernivsky, head of OFEK counseling centre regarding antisemitic violence and discrimination

Since the slaughter of 1,300 in Israel by Hamas on 7 October, antisemitic incidents in Berlin have risen dramatically. On the day of the attacks, activists from Samidoun, a group linked to the organisation of Palestinian terror organisation Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP,) were celebrating on the capital’s streets and distributed sweets in the district of Neukölln, where many people of Arabic descent live.

In the following days, hundreds gathered, shouting anti-Israel slogans such as “From the river to the sea – Palestine will be free”. As Hamas called for global action last Friday, Jewish schools in Berlin remained nearly empty. 

Over the weekend, several houses in Berlin were tagged with Stars of David. Also, an Israeli flag was burned.

Antisemitism is a problem throughout German society. In a recent study, 15.4 percent of Germans agreed with the sentence: “With the policy that Israel makes, I can easily understand that someone has objections against Jews.” 24.2 percent agree to it partially. 

When Hamas terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz Kfar Aza in Israel, Mika, her husband and two-and-a-half-year-old son hid in a shelter.

In their village, Hamas attackers were already killing people. Outside, the Israeli family heard gunfire and lost contact with their loved ones for hours.

One of them was Mika´s 90-years old grandfather, Naftali (Juraj) Fürst.

In the relative safety of his home in Haifa in northern Israel, on 6 October 2023, he experienced a new nightmare that revived his memories of the Holocaust. Nicknamed “Ďurko”, he learned at the age of six in Czechoslovakia that he was a Jew who always had to run away.

His parents were thrown out of their apartment in Bratislava´s suburb Petržalka because it was occupied by the Third Reich. Afterwards he and his family fell victim to persecution by the Slovak fascist Tiso regime, and he was imprisoned in four concentration camps.

However, little Jurko was lucky and had a strong determination to live, Later, he left for Israel, where he witnessed eight wars. But nothing prepared him for the last Shabbat, the holiday of peace, on 7 October.

For long hours, he worried whether his family would survive.

“We bound the shelter door in telephone wire so that terrorists couldn’t open it from the outside,” Fürst’s granddaughter told him. “We were very afraid. We had knives in their hands just in case the terrorists broke in.”

All the time, they had no idea what was going on outside.

The Bratislava-born Israeli argued we should not compare the present war against Hamas with the holocaust.

“It is terrible and painful, but it is not the Shoah,” he said. “In spite of everything, we have an army, even though it didn’t work properly. This catastrophe lasted a few hours, it doesn’t compare to the Holocaust.”

How different are France and Germany’s approaches to managing extreme right-wing movements? Bénédicte Laumond, lecturer in political science at the University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, reveals the contrasting policies.

What policies does France have to combat right-wing radicalism?

France has no real public policy against right-wing radicalism. However, the public authorities take measures to curb certain right-wing extremist groups, for example by monitoring the activities of the most violent ones. When the judiciary sentences radical right-wing activists for hate speech, it also regulates the activities of this political faction.

How can France better equip itself to combat this problem?

It is possible to transfer certain German measures to France, but they must be adapted to the French political culture, which is characterised by a watertight division, in people’s minds, between radical right-wing parties such as the Rassemblement National and non-party radical right-wing groups, which are more prone to violence.

For most French people, it is unacceptable to touch the former, while the latter can be the subject of measures that are, for the moment, repressive. The introduction of preventive initiatives to limit the influence of the latter could be an interesting option.

How is Germany different in its approach?

In Germany, right-wing radicalism is framed as a potential threat to the liberal democratic order, justifying the implementation of a coordinated set of repressive and preventive measures. In 1949, Germany enshrined in its constitution the need to guard against so-called extremist movements, i.e. those actively opposed to the values enshrined in the constitution.

As a result, the Germans have developed a series of interrelated measures to contain the influence of extremist groups. Over the past twenty years, the German authorities, supported by a mobilised civil society, have invested heavily in the development of federal, regional and local programmes to prevent right-wing radicalism.

These programmes fund civil society initiatives to combat right-wing radicalism on the ground, from programs to help radical activists disengage, to popular education projects and cultural events to promote tolerance.